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Abstract 
 
Tenuous political and economic times call for increased oversight and improved 
results from military counterinsurgency programs in Afghanistan, programs that provide 
agile non-kinetic weapons, critical for commanders fighting in today’s asymmetric battle 
space.  This paper proposes a decision tool for construction projects executed under the 
Commanders Emergency Response Program, designed to meet the changing demands of 
fighting an amorphous insurgency among dynamic systems of stakeholders.  The research 
first conducted a system analysis of the CERP project execution process identifying key 
findings addressing value adding inputs.  The research then applies a Causal Chain, 
borrowed from the Emergency Management field to identify contributions of early 
system inputs and expand the aperture on project outcomes to include their long-term 
impacts.  The research suggests that the Commanders Emergency Response Program can 
improve outcomes by considering a broader perspective of the system using the Causal 
Chain, delaying project outcome determination, expanding the pool and increasing the 
meaningful involvement of stakeholders, driving outcome focused decision making.  The 
research hopes to contribute to improving the outcomes of the Commanders Emergency 
Response Program and provide a useful framework to describe the system during future 
policy decisions for the program. 
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IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS OF MONETARY WEAPON SYSTEMS IN 
AFGHANISTAN  
 
I.  Introduction 
On September 11, 2001, the largest terrorist attack on American soil shook the 
foundation of United States’ (U.S.) national security and changed the course of military 
operations for the following decade.  In the aftermath of the events that were to follow, 
the U.S. and allies were faced with the reality of settling into a different type of war, a 
counterinsurgency (COIN) fight between anti-GIRoA elements and a U.S.-Afghan 
coalition. Opponents in this battle struggle to be favored by balance of the Afghan 
population that has yet to take a side.  Eventually the sides must also combat their own 
supporters’ will to fight.  The Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) has 
been a weapon in the arsenal for coalition forces, who have been seeking to prevent 
violent actions by the insurgency and win support of the local population for the freely 
elected Afghan government.  The primary wielders of the CERP weapon are the 
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), specialized military units designed to execute 
CERP infrastructure development projects for the Afghan people.  CERP funding is set 
aside for urgent humanitarian assistance (36 DOD FMR 7000.14-R, 2009) used to benefit 
the Afghanistan population by contracting development and reconstruction projects 
across U.S. controlled provinces in Afghanistan.   
This chapter offers a background about COIN, CERP, and the grievances about 
CERP.  Next, the chapter provides justification why it is necessary complaints about 
CERP be addressed and it identifies the objectives and intentions of the research.  The 
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chapter then defines the scope and method for what will be studied.  Finally, it delivers an 
overview of the remaining chapters in the thesis. 
COIN Background 
The primary focus of this research is on a system intended to manipulate the 
tenuous relationships within Afghanistan to meet strategic objectives.  The focus on the 
relationships and the nature of fighting a non-state opponent represents a major shift in 
U.S. war fighting dynamics.   
Role of Noncombatants 
Counterinsurgency warfare differs from conventional interstate conflicts because 
of the primary focus on noncombatants.  The conflict exists, not between two warring 
states, but among a tri-party relationship involving insurgents, the government, and the 
local population (Akerlof, 1997; Atkinson, 2010; Berman, 2011).  As described by Mao 
Tse-Tung, the favor of the population is so important because “guerrillas must live in and 
among the people as fish swim in the sea” (Tse-Tung, 1937).  The importance of the 
people is echoed throughout counterinsurgency literature (Trinquier, 1961; Galula, 1964; 
Sepp, 2005; Petraeus, 2006; Cassidy, 2008; Johnson, 2008; Atkinson, et al., 2010; 
Berman, et al., 2011).  The noncombatant population is important in counterinsurgency 
warfare because it is simultaneously the source of strength and great vulnerability for 
rebel fighters.  The people are a source of reinforcements, concealment, and supplies for 
insurgents.  Insurgent opposition needs the support of the people for economic stability, 
information about the insurgency, and democratic legitimacy.  The insurgency tends to 
thrive when the population is on its side and declines when it is not (Atkinson, et al., 
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2010). The next section will explore different theories about how to manipulate this three 
party relationship, and how CERP fits into the U.S. strategy. 
COIN Theories 
Theories about how to gain the favor of the noncombatants vary greatly and have 
considerable implications for the focus of counterinsurgency strategy.  One feature that 
seems to be common among theories is the need for more than just kinetic actions to fight 
insurgents.  Also, coercive strategies cannot operate independently of targeted military 
force.  Supply of Rebels is a theory that contends that no amount of support from the 
government can buy the favor of local people so long as the government cannot secure 
the area and enforce legitimate economic trade (Ross, 2004).  In the Opportunity Cost 
theory, the economic cost of supporting the rebels rises to an unacceptable level because 
of other benefits that would be lost by supporting the insurgents.  Agriculture 
development teams (ADT), deployed across Afghanistan, seek to raise the opportunity 
cost of rebellion.  For example, the ADTs attempt to educate farmers about legitimate 
agriculture exports so that profits from farming become more advantageous, although 
time consuming, than supporting the insurgency (Becker, 1968).  Recent popular 
movements have also targeted education and women’s rights as a means to combat 
insurgency.  In Greg Mortenson’s book, Three Cups of Tea, he describes his effort to 
build schools to educate women, citing the idea that educated mothers are less likely to 
raise children that would support insurgents (Mortenson, 2006).  Again, an educated 
population would also be exposed to more economically attractive opportunities than 
supporting insurgents.  Yet others believe that the war cannot be as easily manipulated as 
these theories suggest, by addressing grievances and providing better services.   
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Some theorists argue that low gross domestic product per capita is a symptom of 
weak government and is a motivator for political rebellion.  Things like low GDP and 
rough terrain that makes government control more challenging, cannot be addressed by 
providing benefits or raising the opportunity cost.  Also, the theories depend on an idea 
that a division can exist between coercive and attractive means of fighting insurgents 
(Kress and Szechtman, 2008).  This notion is impractical because these events occur 
simultaneously in a COIN fight, and a population cannot make a distinction between the 
people within an outside organization providing benefits to the population and those 
outsiders that are dealing them harm.  Realistically, actions of both sides of the struggle 
affect the position of the noncombatants, as well as contradictory actions within either 
side.  For example, a much needed public infrastructure project’s benefits can be negated 
and even overshadowed by misinformed targeting of military strikes.   
U.S. Strategy 
The United States foreign actions in Afghanistan focus on a theory called “Hearts 
and Minds” (Berman, 2008).  The goal of the theory is to reduce the demand for 
rebellion.  In this theory, beneficiaries of aid and services reciprocate by showing support 
for the provider in terms of aid, cooperation or information (Horowitz, 1985).  The 
program is designed to enable commanders to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and 
reconstruction requirements that will assist the indigenous population and reduce their 
desire to oppose the Afghan government (36 DOD FMR 7000.14-R, 2009). 
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CERP Background 
Following the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. was faced with determining what 
to do with seized dinar found in palaces throughout the country.  It was determined that 
the money had been stolen from the people of Iraq and should be used to benefit them.  In 
the aftermath of the U.S. invasion, the money was used to fund rebuilding projects to 
address destroyed infrastructure and provide humanitarian assistance to affected Iraqis. 
While implementing these small-scale rebuilding projects, American Forces discovered 
reconstruction was a powerful non-kinetic weapon for winning the hearts and minds of 
local people (Martins, 2005).  The success led to the U.S. Congress passing a bill to fund 
CERP on November 6, 2003 with the intent of providing guidance for how money could 
be used, who could be the recipient of reconstruction spending, and to fund the program 
in the future (Martins, 2005).  According to the newly established CERP guidance, the 
construction contracts had to show direct benefit to the Iraqi people and meet urgent 
humanitarian need before military engineers could obligate the money.  Congress’ action 
not only allocated U.S. dollars to fund the CERP, but also expanded the program to be 
used in Afghanistan. 
CERP Evolution 
Since the expansion of CERP as a tool to be used in Afghanistan, CERP has been 
used to build new infrastructure.  Building infrastructure where it did not previously exist 
is an example of CERP’s evolution from being a rebuilding tool to simply a building tool.  
This expanded use led to questions about how “urgent humanitarian need” was being 
determined.  The U.S. Congress has questioned if money allocated under the program has 
been effective at addressing urgent humanitarian need, and fulfilling its intended strategic 
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purpose for Afghanistan, drawing Afghan people closer to their government as a means 
to weaken popular support for the insurgency.  
CERP Perspectives 
There are several key CERP project stakeholders.  The perspective of each of 
these stakeholders reflects varying interests and motivations which contribute to how 
project success is defined.  Depending on the project, different interests are met and in 
some cases competing interests emerge.  Also, key stakeholders often have decidedly 
different ideas about how CERP projects should be implemented or what the projects 
should seek to achieve. 
Congress vs Military 
One such issue is the difference in opinion between American politicians and 
military commanders about CERP.  CERP is both disliked by members of Congress 
while being lauded by military implementers because of its speed, flexibility, and ease of 
execution.  Congress wants greater accountability, oversight and a more robust 
nomination and planning phase with defined project outcomes and success criteria 
leading to increased quality in projects where U.S. money is spent.  The military has a 
greater interest in the outcome of spending the money and appears to care less about the 
quality of the product provided that the desired outcome is achieved. 
Tactical vs Tactical 
There is also a division between how CERP has been used by tactical 
commanders with different missions.  CERP effects have suffered from a lack of 
communication and coordination between units carrying out missions in the same area of 
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operations (AO).  From personal experience, sometimes missions within the same AO 
have had contradictory effects. 
Common differences between tactical implementers of CERP are summarized in 
the United States Institute of Peace publication of three sets of “recurring tradeoffs”: 
1. Stability vs. Host Nation Legitimacy: This tradeoff refers to the conflict between 
the urgent need for international actors to secure the peace, and the possibility that 
these actions are not seen by the host nation population as connected to their local 
leaders or government and do not build the legitimacy or capacity of the host 
nation; 
2. Expediency vs. Sustainability: This tradeoff refers to differences between 
targeting short-term actions that show a peace dividend and signal that violent 
conflict is over, but are not sustainable by the host nation over time, and those 
actions that may not have an immediate impact on the perceptions of peace, but 
develop over time and establish conditions that can be sustained by the local 
population after the intervening party is gone; 
3. Meeting Needs vs. Building Capacity: This third tradeoff refers to the quandary 
faced by international actors- governmental and nongovernmental- when it is 
easier to fulfill needs directly than to build host nation capacity to deliver critical 
assistance (Cole et. al., 2009). 
The tradeoffs illustrate the differences among commanders as to how they spend 
CERP funding.  As an example, Infantry units are likely to nominate projects that will aid 
in establishing stability, expediency, and basic needs in an AO to create peaceful 
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conditions and reduce the violence for their team and the local population.  As a counter 
example, a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is more likely to use CERP to execute 
the host nation government’s development plan.  Executing the development plan would 
advance the capacity of the local leaders and, over the long term, create conditions where 
international intervention is not needed to maintain peace and rule of law within their 
AO.  In the two examples, neither position is wrong.  The Infantry unit and the PRT have 
different missions and use the CERP to help to achieve their respective tactical 
objectives. 
Tactical vs. Host Nation Government 
Some PRT projects, however, have been identified as performing tasks that 
properly belong to local and provincial governments, conflicting with the capacity 
development mission of coalition PRTs (Bowen Testimony, 2007).  The United Nations 
Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on Development, Mark Ward (2010), criticized the 
U.S. PRTs for pursuing small projects that provide services for the Afghan people that 
local governments are capable of providing and thus undermining their authority.  The 
overlapping lines of authority and lanes of responsibility have weakened an otherwise 
capable government.  These actions led to Afghan President Hamid Karzai, early in 2011, 
calling for PRTs to be withdrawn from Afghanistan.  This accusation emphasizes the 
point that CERP projects have lacked the ability to plan projects that build sustainable 
capacity into the future and look beyond current needs. 
Tactical vs Strategic 
Additionally, there are complaints that CERP and its usefulness for tactical 
commanders have failed to address strategic objectives (Bowen, 2007).  Tactical units 
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and local governments must align their actions with higher authority and plans.  Tactical 
military units do themselves a disservice by fulfilling needs and meeting short term self-
serving objectives, never addressing long term conditions for withdrawal and establishing 
strategic conditions.  Similarly, local governments cannot implement independent 
strategies from their national government from whom they seek funding and support if 
they want sustainable efforts to be supported with national funding.  The local actions 
must be within the bounds of larger strategic plans so that coordinated response can be 
achieved across multiple tactical spaces. 
In fairness to tactical commanders, the higher level plans have not always been 
made clear, nor training sufficient to understand the intricacies of imbedding efforts 
within the Afghan development and sustainability plans.  Previous research reinforces 
this issue and raises others that will be elaborated on in the coming paragraphs 
(Inguagiato, 2010).  Iguagiato highlighted the following list of the shortcomings of CERP 
at the Tactical and Strategic levels in his report entitled Operational Art and the 
Commanders’ Emergency Response Program. 
At the tactical level: decentralized project selection and execution, 
intentionally minimalist controls, great availability of resources that are 
sometimes in excess of capacity to execute them, and susceptibility to 
fraud, waste and abuse.  
At the operational level: lack of unity of effort within DOD 
commands as well as between these commands and the interagency, the 
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international community, and the host nation.  There is also a lack of 
clearly defined objectives and effectiveness metrics (Inguagiato, 2010). 
CERP Complaints 
As time passed, reports of program effectiveness were mixed.  Domestically, 
political and military leaders have questioned the results of the program and called for 
accountability of the funding.  According to the Special Investigator General for 
Afghanistan reports investigations into the CERP’s use in Afghanistan and Iraq yielded 
little certainty about the motivations behind projects implemented using the program and 
their link to a larger strategic objective.  Additionally, CERP projects have had 
questionable results and inconclusive outcomes (SIGAR Audit 11-7).  Another complaint 
includes the existence of competing objectives of CERP role players at various 
operational levels, each with different interests and affected by the program uniquely. 
Oversight 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports have also cited CERP 
personnel for having “limited capacity to manage and oversee contractor performance 
properly” and for ”having no performance metrics” (GOA, 2008).  The GAO report went 
on to say that “federal agencies should develop plans that establish objective, 
quantifiable, and measurable performance goals that should be achieved by a program” 
(GOA, 2008).  Projects cited often used anecdotal information or informal means to 
assess the projects.  This failure to account for the effects of a project means that there is 
insufficient data to accurately assess the results and outcomes of the money that has been 
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spent on CERP projects.  Additionally, the report states that without the information there 
is insufficient evidence to evaluate additional requests for funding (GOA, 2008). 
Inconclusive Results 
The CERP projects that are used to target the hearts and minds of the Afghan 
population in the counterinsurgency battle have had inconclusive results.  Failing to yield 
conclusive evidence of CERP effects, the DoD has received criticism from Congress, the 
Government Accountability Office and SIGAR for continuing to spend U.S. dollars 
without knowing what to expect.  Congress implemented changes to the CERP project 
nomination documents that requires measures of effectiveness be included in each 
project’s nomination package.  The change was intended to aid assessment of a 
nominated project’s anticipated results in order to determine the project’s worthiness for 
funding and implementation.  However, these measures of effectiveness have failed to 
provide post-project-closeout accounting of quantifiable results for individual CERP 
project’s impacts (SIGAR Audit 11-7). 
Measurement 
Inconclusive results of projects and the output described by the nomination 
packages’ measures of effectiveness have led to a desire for research into how outcomes 
of these projects can be quantified.  In a hearing before the House Armed Services 
Committee, Congresswoman Susan Davis (Cal) asked, “How are we measuring 
effectiveness of PRTs?” (HASC No. 110-96). The questions and hearings that followed 
outlined a string of unanswered questions about how the United States Military is 
implementing the Congressionally appropriated CERP. 
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Planning, Management, Direction 
In his expert testimony before Congress, Stuart Bowen cited CERP for having 
weak planning, repeated shifts in program direction, poor management oversight, and 
inconclusive outcomes, as sources of wasteful government spending (Bowen, 2007). 
The U.S. Government has outlined problems with CERP in numerous government 
reports and testimony before Congress that document each complaint.  In order to be 
more effective as a tool for gaining popular favor for the Afghan Government, CERP 
needs to undergo change.  There must a unified position for American political and 
military leaders with regard to the CERP purpose, objectives, intent, and goals.  As a tool 
for military implementation, it is important that it remains flexible for diverse sets of 
objectives and quick to implement to meet rapidly changing battlefield conditions.  CERP 
projects must have clear direction supporting sustainable strategic goals, and they must 
also have outcomes that can be measured and do not undermine host nation authority.   
Problem Statement 
The question is: how to move beyond the current state of the program to meet 
these new requirements? 
However, program guidance is unclear about what CERP is supposed to achieve 
and how the results are to be recorded and measured with regard to each perspective 
highlighted previously.  Without clear guidance, the program has become a tool that 
meets the needs of its implementers rather than its beneficiaries.  Additionally, specific 
plans for the program need to be provided to project nominators to provide direction for a 
variety of military implementers, linking strategic and tactical objectives, and offering a 
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timeline, payback period, and well-defined project planning horizon to define success for 
individual projects and the program.  
The problems need to be addressed so that U.S. dollars are spent with specific 
purposes and to achieve specific outcomes.  Without the means and requirement to drive 
the change, money will continue to be spent with uncertain results, there will continue to 
be an inability to learn from earlier successes or failures, and there can be no course 
correction in the ongoing conflict.  By studying these issues, implementers of the 
program will: gain insight into how to better yield beneficial results for Afghans and 
Americans, have better use of resources, and produce increased satisfaction with the 
program.  
The current tight U.S. economy has heightened the public’s awareness of where 
personal resources are spent. In consideration for thrifty citizens, their Government 
should also increase its consciousness of how taxpayer money is spent.  Therefore, it is 
desirable to improve the impact to cost ratio in terms of lives and money, especially 
under current economic conditions.  Executing due diligence for protecting taxpayer 
money will contribute to the willingness of Americans to support foreign operations and 
stave off the degrading effects unconstrained spending with uncertain results has on 
morale. 
Beyond course correction, economic responsibility, and combating degrading 
public morale, it is imperative to analyze and address problems with U.S. CERP program 
spending to learn about its effectiveness as a tool for future use.  The method by which 
the U.S. will fight wars of the future is being developed today, and as much as the 
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development of next generation fighters is important, so too is the development of 
effective and efficient means to fight asymmetric, non-state foes. 
In light of this problem, several research attempts have been made to address the 
issues stated in this section.  The following section provides an overview of some of these 
previous research efforts and shows how they contribute to this study. 
Previous Research Review 
 “Dozens of reports and articles published during the past six years have sought to 
analyze, criticize and recommend action regarding the progress of reconstruction aid” 
(Tarnoff, 2009).  The following section will provide a brief overview of some of the 
relevant research that contributes to the current state of attempts to address the problems, 
specifically focusing on the methods that have been used to address the issues and 
provide recommendations. 
System Modeling 
To evaluate the effectiveness of various counterinsurgency tools many authors 
have attempted to model tools’ effects leading to varying outcomes.  Likewise descriptive 
models have yielded various prescriptions for successful counterinsurgency strategies 
(Howell, 2007; Damalas, 2008; Kress and Szechtman, 2009; Atkinson, et al., 2010; 
Condrey, 2010; Kaplan, 2010; Berman, 2011).  One issue that has arisen is the intense 
information requirements for modeling counterinsurgency systems without recorded data 
available to support the research, as with attempts to model the effects of CERP.  
Previous attempts at COIN modeling have relied heavily on data that are often 
incomplete, statistically noisy, or unavailable (Atkinson, Kress, Szechtman, 2010).  For 
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this reason, this research will not include simulations and complex mathematical models 
that rely on intensive data requirements.  Because of the many variables regarding the 
time, place, environment and effects of the CERP and the lack of programmed records of 
this nature, other research methods are explored. 
Other Previous Methods 
Johnson (2008) implemented a three step method to evaluate another 
counterinsurgency tool, the Combined Action Program.  She began with extensive 
surveying of primary sources, including the program’s standard operating procedures and 
secondary sources to expand the contextual base for the research.  Second, she compared 
and contrasted the characteristics of the uses of the program including interviews and 
individual memoirs.  Finally, Johnson focused on comparing and contrasting the 
insurgencies of Vietnam and Iraq to evaluate differences in the results.  
In another study, Weber (2010) outlined a model for post-conflict planning, which 
highlighted project selection criteria.  To validate the conclusions, he used a non-
experimental design method that enforced conceptual criterion and relied on personal 
experience before submitting the model for peer review and senior military comment.  
Research Objectives, Goals, and Intent 
The objective of this thesis was to investigate methods that will further 
understanding about how implementation of the Commander's Emergency Response 
Program (CERP) can return improved strategic outcomes in Afghanistan that contribute 
to U.S. foreign interests.  This research sought to identify CERP guidance changes that 
are necessary in CERP processes to move the system toward increased accountability and 
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effectiveness.  The goal of the research was to contribute system perspective that may 
help yield change and lead to improvements in the CERP.  Additionally, the desired 
results of the research could eventually address how to provide a targeted system that 
reinforces strategic goals and is aligned with supporting the Afghan government, and 
how to provide a system that records metrics within each project enabling course 
correction should it be needed. 
Scope and Limitations 
Results from previous studies have not been able to quantify the benefits of 
construction projects executed under CERP.  Data collected about the construction 
projects have historically addressed the outputs of the program, but failed to target the 
outcomes.  Current data include what was accomplished and how well, but not if efforts 
were correct in order to achieve intended effects.  This research is not be able to quantify 
outcomes because of limitations in previously collected data available for the study.  The 
research attempts to identify data requirements and program changes, so future 
researchers may have the tools necessary to meet Congress’ call for accountability.   
This study does not quantify benefits or suggest how they ought to be quantified.  
Rather, this study addresses the guidance and process for executing a project, from 
nomination through contract closeout.  The research offers suggestions about how the 
process may be improved so that cost-benefit analysis might be accomplished during 
future project planning.  The scope is limited to the guiding documents and process 
because the burden of revisiting completed projects to determine their effectiveness and 
benefits is time consuming and cost prohibitive.  Additionally, preventing the researchers 
17 
from doing a more quantitative analysis, the right information about projects, outcomes, 
resource allocation and the true cost of the projects has not been recorded under the 
current system. 
This research is supported by information and contributions from members of the 
United States Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) and the office of the United States 
Secretary of Defense for Policy (OSD-P-CERP) and is intended to be a cooperative effort 
to improve oversight and accountability for U.S. taxpayer dollars used in Afghanistan.  It 
is not intended to solve the problem, but further highlight the issue and begin an AFIT 
research stream that can eventually address program outcomes and improve program 
effectiveness.  The research is not intended to conjecture about the strategy that drives the 
CERP program, but accepting the strategic intent of the program, this research strives to 
address concerns identified within reports, audits and by critics. 
This research is based on CERP project data reported in project files on the 
Afghan common operating picture database of record, Combined Information Data 
Network Exchange (CIDNE) between 2004 and 2010.  The data reported previously do 
not include information concerning confounding variables about the local population that 
impact project success and outcomes, such as ethnicity, political affiliation, ideological 
association, or other indicators of predisposition to accept the impact of CERP projects.  
The research will not be able to provide any analysis about what projects are effective or 
distinguish between groups for targeting of future projects.   
Other large development agencies commonly base outcomes on qualitative 
sampling (World Bank IEG, 2006).  Afghans are not included or accessible for the 
research to evaluate previous project outcomes through this method.  Also, reliable CERP 
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project outcome measurements are unavailable for previous projects.  In the past, CERP 
contracts have not included provisions directly measuring or observing public reaction to 
CERP projects with quantitative measures.  Therefore, outcomes of previous projects will 
be based on SIGAR reports about project success, wherever possible. 
“Success” is intentionally left undefined to allow varying conditions within a 
specific AO to be accommodated by a broad definition and to account for incongruent 
definitions across AOs.  The intent is not to identify success, but to allow local 
circumstances to determine how to define the conditions of a successful project. 
In addition to the availability of data, the research is constrained by the time 
available to conduct the research.  First, the research is conducted during an 18 month 
Master’s Degree program at the Air Force Institute of Technology and must be concluded 
within this window of time as a graduation requirement.  Second, the ongoing mission 
and changing operational environment the research addresses limits the usefulness of the 
information and research results to a defined time period and set of regulations.  In an 
effort to remain current and useful, the research must be conducted within a cycle of 
guidance and policy so that it may contribute relevant findings to future policy decisions. 
Finally, the research includes personal experiences and observations among the 
sources of data included in the research.  The introduction of personal experience 
introduces bias to the research.  Among these biases are anchoring, availability, recency, 
and cognitive dissonance.  The reliance on the personal memory of the researcher’s 
experiences has an accepted and acknowledged impact on the research results.  By 
understanding possible impacts of the introduced bias, the researcher intentionally 
19 
attempts to mitigate the effects by reviewing findings considering possible biases and 
identifying them in the research so that the reader may also consider their implications. 
Research Question 
How can the CERP be improved to yield measurable, positive outcomes across 
tactical level partners and aligned with strategic level intentions? 
Scope and Approach 
To explore this research question, this study utilizes a method that capitalizes on 
some results of descriptive models and employs a Causal Chain risk analysis technique to 
illustrate points of failure in the current process and suggest interventions.  In order to 
address the research question the researcher implements a phased approach seeking 
answers to a series of investigative questions.  Phase one is a process analysis of CERP 
construction projects, phase two is a systems dynamics interpretation of the system using 
a causal chain analysis to develop recommendations for program change across a 
spectrum of program perspectives. 
Phase One:   
A process analysis is conducted to identify gaps in CERP process execution 
where program guidance fails to achieve greater project impact. The data sources used for 
the analysis are CERP policy, guidance, and funding requirements.  In this phase of the 
analysis researchers look at CERP construction project implementation from project 
inception, through nomination and approval, to closeout and evaluation.  The analysis 
illustrates the flow of information between stakeholders and key activities that contribute 
to project outcome.  Stakeholders and activities are those that are outlined in the guidance 
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and standard operating procedures for the CERP program.  Completing this research 
phase provides answers for the following investigative questions: 
 
Phase One Investigative Questions: 
1. In the CERP execution process, what value do required inputs contribute to 
project success? 
2. Which project stakeholders are considered, emphasized in current project 
nomination requirements? 
3. What consideration is given to process outcomes vs. outputs in the current CERP 
process? 
Phase One Intent and Anticipated Results: 
Having answered the investigative questions for phase one, the research is in a 
position to investigate what may be insufficient and likely causes of underperformance 
within project processes, and what impact the current processes have had on project 
outcomes.  Results contribute to the development of process interventions that nest within 
the larger causal chain of events described in Phase two of the research.  It is expected 
that the results of phase one indicate that current process requirements fall short of 
ensuring a cohesive plan to improve stakeholder positions and maximize the benefits of 
the program and achieve optimal CERP funding success. 
Phase Two:  
The knowledge gained from phase one contributes to the researcher’s ability to 
target changes to the process and program guidance in order to develop a plan for how to 
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transform the program from the current state to a desired program for the future that 
improves measurability, yields positive outcomes across tactical level partners while 
remaining aligned with strategic level intentions. 
Phase two of the research includes a notional system view of the CERP 
reconstruction project process to help facilitate process implementer decision making and 
communication between various stakeholders.   The systems view is described using a 
Causal Chain method to illustrate the links between events, there intended consequences 
and the impact on the system as a whole.   
The Causal Chain method is a way to describe a system of linked events that 
contribute to a particular incident, effect outcomes and lead to consequence.  As a 
framework it is useful to describe each of the links in the chain that represent event 
milestones and how they contribute to the overall path toward a culminating 
consequence.  Typically, the Causal Chain is used to highlight the events leading up to a 
catastrophic event and its resulting consequences in the hazard management field of 
study.  An example of a Causal Chain can be found in Appendix A.  It is a method that 
describes the key events that take place in some linear time sequence and lead to a major 
event and some consequence.  The consequence in emergency management is generally 
something that ideally would be avoided or prevented, like flood damage or loss of life.  
In order to avoid this consequence, feedback loops that represent the learning that takes 
place out of the occurrence of such a consequence, are added to the causal chain in the 
form of interventions resulting from the learning.  An example of an intervention might 
be establishing a flood plain to educate builders of the risks associated with building 
within the plain.  This learning from previous floods can lead to a positive impact on the 
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causal chain toward preventing further damages from floods.  Feedback represents 
learning and the resulting interventions that can be made to impact the causal chain.  
These interventions may have both positive impact and negative consequences on the 
causal chain that should each be considered. 
For the purposes of this research, rather than the chain leading to a negative 
occurrence, the Causal Chain seeks positive consequences or a “successful” outcome of a 
given CERP project.  The events along the causal chain represents a tactical CERP 
timeline that begins with events that shape the program and the implementer, contributes 
to a defined incident, and finally leads to an outcome and resulting consequences. Results 
from phase one of the research fit within the Causal Chain as interventions between the 
incident and its effect.  The proposed interventions to the project chain are designed to 
break a chain of negative events leading to a negative consequence.  Other interventions 
represent current standard operating procedures and training that are in place at the time 
of the research and are intended to help shape project implementers decision making 
capability and provide sufficient cultural and background knowledge to influence the 
course of events that will lead to a successful project.   
Through this method this phase seeks to answer the following investigative 
questions: 
Phase Two Investigative Questions: 
1. How does the current preparation of the CERP battle space effect events and 
consequences of the CERP process? 
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2. How may proposed interventions from Phase One contribute and affect the CERP 
causal chain? 
Phase Two Intent and Anticipated Results: 
The key contribution of this phase is helping to identify a structure to describe the 
impact of interventions on the Causal Chain leading to a project outcome, hopefully 
project “success.”  Each intervention addresses a key perspective of various stakeholders 
in the CERP project.  The perspectives contribute to how outcome success is defined.  
Key perspectives include, but are not limited to those contrasting viewpoints described in 
the CERP Complaints section of this paper.   
Assumptions 
The following assumptions are important to the validity of the results, and for the 
purposes of this research are assumed to be true. 
1. CERP’s target population is composed of rational decision makers that act in their 
own best interest when presented with varying inputs from either side of the 
counterinsurgency. 
2. The data reported about CERP projects is accurate.   
3. The complaints and questions about CERP that drive this research are justified 
and are accepted by researcher and experts.  This will allow the research to move 
forward with providing recommendations and methods to address concerns 
without being a specific critique itself. 
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Anticipated Significance 
 This research may help identify shortfalls in CERP guidance and their 
contribution to the larger COIN strategy and help illuminate a need for more reliable 
outcome measurement practices for projects and better targeting of project selection to 
attain strategic ends.       
Overview of Remaining Chapters 
This thesis employs a scholarly article format.  The following chapter is the article 
produced from the research, which has been accepted by the 2012 Western Decision 
Science Institute Annual Conference.  The article provides the body of this thesis and 
contains all the elements of research in its layout as prescribed by the peer review 
conference.  As an independent chapter, it includes an abstract, introduction, literature 
review, objective, limitations, project descriptions, research question and methods, 
analysis and results, recommendation, and conclusions.  Chapter 3 follows the article 
with a more comprehensive discussion of the research results and conclusions along with 
possibilities for future research and the research summary. 
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II. Scholarly Article 
 Presented to the April 2012 Western Decision Science Institute 
Conference 
Tactical Counterinsurgency Decision Tool for the Commander’s Emergency 
Response Program 
Seth Lorimer, Peter Feng, Tay Johannes 
Abstract 
Tenuous political and economic times call for increased oversight and improved 
results from military counterinsurgency programs in Afghanistan, programs that provide 
agile non-kinetic weapons, critical for commanders fighting in today’s asymmetric battle 
space.  This paper proposes a decision tool for construction projects executed under the 
Commanders Emergency Response Program, designed to meet the changing demands of 
fighting an amorphous insurgency among dynamic systems of stakeholders. 
Research Question: How can the CERP be improved to yield measurable, 
positive outcomes across tactical level partners and aligned with strategic level 
intentions? 
Purpose: The purpose of this research is to enhance understanding about the 
impact of project selection on the intended outcomes intended to benefit a vulnerable 
population in Afghanistan.     
Research Method: Systems Analysis applying a Causal Chain method borrowed 
from the Emergency Management field.  
Findings: This paper documents how preparatory events contribute to project 
selection and ultimately the outcome and consequences of the projects.  The decision 
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point at project selection has strong implications for long-term outcomes of strategic 
objectives.    
Implications: The research indicates a need to reexamine impetus for project 
selection practices in the pursuit of measurable effects that are tied to strategic objectives.  
Value for Practitioners: This paper will help identify program shortfalls and 
promotes an application the Causal Chain to aid project selection.    
Keywords:  CERP, COIN, reconstruction, causal chain, development, process 
control, construction management. 
Paper type: Full paper 
Introduction 
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001 the United States (U.S.) and allies invaded 
Afghanistan to seek justice, making no distinction between those responsible for the 
attacks and people that harbored them.  In the continuing effort to deny Al-Qaeda safe 
haven in Afghanistan, America would face a different type of war, a counterinsurgency 
(COIN) fight.  In COIN operations, opponents battle for support of the population in 
order to create stability and deny the opposition a source of recruits and resources. The 
Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) has been a powerful weapon in 
this fight and “is an absolutely critical and flexible counterinsurgency tool,” according to 
the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Hon. Michele A. Flournoy. (Levin, 2010). 
A decade after the initial forces deployed to Afghanistan, Usama Bin Laden is 
dead and U.S. political and military leaders face increasing challenges at home and 
abroad associated with justifying the ongoing engagement in Afghanistan.  Among them 
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are challenges to produce visible and quantifiable results, accounting for progress and 
justifying the cost of the burdensome conflict.  Previous attempts have failed to provide 
sufficient results to satisfy America’s insatiable appetite for answers. However, this paper 
outlines a new perspective and provides a decision tool to meet the need. 
Background 
In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion in Iraq, seized money funded rebuilding 
projects that repaired destroyed infrastructure and provided humanitarian assistance to aid 
affected Iraqis. While implementing these small-scale rebuilding projects, American 
Forces discovered reconstruction was a powerful non-kinetic weapon for winning the 
hearts and minds of local people.  “CERP dollars have been of enormous value to the 
effort in Iraq (and in Afghanistan, to which the concept migrated in 2003 as well)” 
(Petraeus, 2006).  Sen. Jim Inhofe (R-Okla.), a senior member of the Senate Armed 
Services Committee (SASC), added “CERP provides an immediate and tangible impact 
on the people of Afghanistan, providing basic services such as water, energy and roads 
which in turn affect security and economic well-being” (Levin, 2010).  Since its 
expansion to Afghanistan, CERP has been used to build new infrastructure.  Building 
new infrastructure illustrates the evolution of CERP from a rebuilding tool to an 
offensive counterinsurgency weapon.  For 2011, CERP was funded up to $800M by U.S. 
National Defense Authorization Act “for the purpose of enabling United States military 
commanders in [Afghanistan] to respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction 
requirements within their areas of responsibility by carrying out programs that will 
immediately assist the [Afghan] people” (Skelton, 2010).  This evolution led to questions 
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about how “urgent humanitarian need” was being determined in CERP.  Additionally, the 
U.S. Congress has questioned if money allocated under the program, for Afghanistan, has 
been effective at fulfilling its intended strategic purpose.  It is important to note, under 
this appropriation CERP contracts are not subject to the Federal Acquisition Regulation 
(FAR) and thus the process common to other federal contracts will be explained further. 
Research 
To demonstrate the process the following discussion will describe a common 
generic CERP reconstruction effort as outlined in Figure 1.  CERP reconstruction project 
efforts are led by a military project manager (PM) most commonly, although not 
exclusively, of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), typically a Company Grade 
Officer.  Ideally the driving force leading to project nomination would be the Afghan 
local government officials acting on the guidance and priorities of the provincial 
development council (PDC) in concert with the local provincial development plan (PDP) 
which supports the Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS) outlined by the 
government of Afghanistan.  A nominated project must meet a series of checks for CERP 
funding outlined by the current Money As A Weapon System-Afghanistan (MAAWS-A) 
standard operating procedure.  The PM then validates the requirement, and should the 
project meet the criteria, it will be placed in the cue to be programmed in accordance with 
a unit determined prioritization process. 
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Figure 1: CERP Project Flowchart 
In order to program a CERP project and nominate it for funding, several things 
are required to be documented.  There must be a signed land use agreement 
demonstrating the legal allocation of the parcel of land to the project. A memorandum 
outlining the operations and maintenance (O&M) plan for the completed project must be 
included, documenting to whom it will be transferred within the host nation.  A statement 
must be included that documents the sustainability of the project and must outline the 
measures taken to ensure the project will last.  A letter of justification for the project is 
also included as a part of the package, and a statement about why Afghan Government 
funds were not available to fund the project.  Finally, the PM compiles the documents 
along with a draft statement of work (SOW) in an Afghan Development Report (ADR) 
on the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE) server.  The PM adds to 
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the ADR, his own estimated project statistics including the project cost based on an 
independent government estimate (IGE), the number of people will be employed by and 
benefit from the project, and a statement of the anticipated executability of the project 
should it be funded.  With the above documents included, the compiled ADR must be 
signed by the unit commander and submitted to the approval chain for funding. 
Remembering that CERP projects are not subject to the FAR, the approval 
authority reevaluates the nominated project and forwards the decision according to the 
cost of the project as outlined in Figure 2.  After the appropriate approval for a project is 
granted, funding is allocated by the Resource Manager (RM) to the project.  In order to 
obligate the allocated funds the PM must next work with the Contracting Officer (KO) to 
solicit bids from local contractors.  Competitive bids are reviewed and commonly the 
contractor (KTR) with the lowest priced bid that is technically acceptable is awarded the 
contract.  Generally, CERP construction contracts are firm fixed price, design-build 
contracts.  After the KO awards the contract, the PM maintains day-to-day oversight over 
the obligated construction contract throughout the project execution.  General tasks 
during project execution include frequent site visits, maintain quality control, assess 
contract compliance, review construction documents, maintain project schedule, and 
evaluate progress to authorize payments.  
Upon substantial completion of the project, the PM will perform a pre-final 
inspection in coordination with the local government appointed recipient to begin the 
process of acceptance and transfer.  After U.S. acceptance of the project and transfer to 
the Afghan recipient, a one year warranty period begins during which the KTR remains 
liable for defects caused by negligence or poor craftsmanship.  Finally, the PM closes out 
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the project’s ADR by reevaluating the anticipated project metrics of costs, schedule, 
Afghans employed and beneficiaries, and providing a statement documenting the 
project’s outcome. 
 
Figure 2: Current CERP Project Flow 
CERP Reconstruction Project Considerations 
CERP project stakeholders, illustrated by the swim lanes in Figure 1 are the first 
critical contributor to consider in project evaluation.  Project success is defined by the 
perspectives of each of these stakeholders, each with varying interests and motivations.  
Stakeholders often have very different ideas about how CERP projects should be 
implemented or what the projects should seek to achieve.  Depending on the project, 
different interests are met and in some cases competing interests emerge.  Also, projects 
do not take place in a vacuum; projects may conflict within a battle space and have 
competing objectives.  In order to effectively achieve intended results through CERP 
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reconstruction and development, the process must consider the perspectives of each 
stakeholder throughout the project. 
The failure to consider stakeholders is evident in the case of some PRT projects 
that have been identified for performing tasks that properly belong to local governments, 
directly conflicting with the capacity development mission (Bowen, 2010).  The United 
Nations Secretary-General’s Special Advisor on Development, Mark Ward, criticized the 
U.S. for pursuing small projects that provide services for the Afghan people that local 
governments are capable of providing thus undermining their authority. Overlapping 
lines of authority and lanes of responsibility have weakened an otherwise capable 
government (Ward, 2010).  These indictments emphasize CERP’s inability to plan 
projects that consider stakeholder interests, build sustainable capacity and maintain a 
horizon beyond immediate needs, leading to Afghan President Hamid Karzai calling for 
the withdrawal of PRTs from Afghanistan. 
Common differences between perspectives of some CERP stakeholders were 
summarized in the United States Institute of Peace publication of three sets of “recurring 
tradeoffs.” 
Stability vs. Host Nation Legitimacy: This tradeoff refers to the conflict 
between the urgent need for international actors to secure the peace, and the 
possibility that these actions are not seen by the host nation population as 
connected to their local leaders or government and do not build the legitimacy or 
capacity of the host nation. 
Expediency vs. Sustainability: This tradeoff refers to differences between 
targeting short-term actions that show a peace dividend and signal that violent 
conflict is over, but are not sustainable by the host nation over time, and those 
actions that may not have an immediate impact on the perceptions of peace, but 
develop over time and establish conditions that can be sustained by the local 
population after the intervening party is gone. 
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Meeting Needs vs. Building Capacity: This third tradeoff refers to the 
quandary faced by international actors- governmental and nongovernmental- 
when it is easier to fulfill needs directly than to build host nation capacity to 
deliver critical assistance (Cole et. Al., 2009). 
 
The tradeoffs illustrate commanders’ differences about how to spend CERP 
funds.  As an example, infantry units are likely to nominate projects that will aid in 
establishing stability, expediency, and basic needs in an area of operations to create 
peaceful conditions for their team and the local population.  As a counter example, a 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) is more likely to use CERP to execute the host 
nation government’s development plan that would develop the capacity of the local 
leaders and, over the long term, establish the host nation government’s legitimacy 
creating a sustainable environment where international intervention is not needed to 
maintain peace and rule of law.  In the two examples, neither position is wrong.  The 
Infantry unit and the PRT have different missions and use the CERP to help to achieve 
their respective tactical objectives, but the tool is degraded when local nationals cannot 
distinguish between the motives of the coalition partner with whom they are working. 
Additionally, there are complaints that CERP, despite proven usefulness for 
tactical commanders, has failed to address U.S. strategic objectives.  Tactical units and 
local governments must align their actions with higher authority and plans.  Tactical 
military units, for example, will not be relieved of additional responsibility and further 
action until strategic conditions for withdrawal have been satisfied.  Similarly, local 
governments must not implement independent strategies from their national government 
from whom they seek funding and support.  Local actions must be within the bounds of 
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larger strategic plans so that coordinated response can be achieved across multiple 
tactical spaces. 
In order to provide the kind of results Congress and the American public are 
seeking, tactical CERP implementers must reconcile the interests of process stakeholders 
and Cole’s tradeoffs during project execution.  This research utilizes a Causal Chain to 
illustrate the impact of key events on the CERP process across a spectrum of program 
perspectives. 
Causal Chain 
The Causal Chain is a tool that has been adapted from the Emergency 
Management field that is used to show how events, exposures and consequences are 
connected through causal sequences, and how incident prevention and mitigation can be 
attained through interruption of the path (van Dorp, 1999).  Figure 3 shows a Causal 
Chain relating to the current CERP process that identifies the key stages of the chain.  At 
its center, the “Incident” refers to a particular event along CERP’s chain with major 
implications for the outcome of projects, the decision point where a project is approved 
and funded.  It is this incident that links the causes of failed projects to the outcomes of 
the failures that have been previously identified from the literature.  
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Figure 3: Causal Chain for Project Selection 
The first link, including stages one to three, is moderated by organizational factors 
that contribute to the cause of the incident.  Moderating the second link, including stages 
three to six, are situational factors that impact the outcomes of the incident.  In each case 
the factors have been identified from previous reports, testimonies, SIGAR inspections 
and personal experience as sources that have likely contributed to project failures.  The 
two links are connected by the project decision to create the causal chain. 
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Figure 4: Causal Chain Interventions 
The purpose for outlining the Causal Chain is to identify how the links can be broken to 
prevent the negative outcomes identified in past projects.  Figure 4 provides interventions 
that can be implemented in the CERP process in order to break the chain of events 
leading to projects of questionable outcomes or inconclusive results identified in 
congressional testimony and inspection reports.  The Causal Chain provides the decision 
maker a tool to break down previous projects and target programmatic changes at critical 
points that contribute to the outcome they desire to change.  Modifying the CERP process 
flow in Figure 2, the proposed interventions and identified new process steps for CERP 
have been incorporated and are presented in Figure 5. The addition of Critical Thinking 
Processes (CTP) at each approval level provides a framework by which the approval 
authority can consider the merits of a project that they are otherwise unfamiliar with and 
may be geographically separated from with different political, cultural and social norms 
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the project may impact and the reviewer should understand.  By driving the evaluation 
criteria, the nomination package must also adapt to provide the requisite information.  
Additionally, the Causal Chain identified a need for lessons learned and feedback from 
previous projects and is incorporated in the updated flow. 
 
Figure 5: Future CERP Project Flow 
“Increasing the number of stakeholders is critical to success” (Petraeus, 2006).  
Stakeholder buy-in is a key change from Figure 1 in the proposed future system state in 
Figure 6 (changes denoted in red).  The proposed future state process diagram highlights 
key stakeholders and incorporates a broader analysis of nominated projects by each 
stakeholder and a shift to Afghan centered nomination and execution to address the 
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incident cause link findings.  As an example, note the addition of the Local Land Owner 
(shaded in grey) as an addition as a stakeholder.  
 
Figure 6: Future CERP Flow Chart 
 Another important change is the delay (represented by the red line) between 
ribbon cutting of the completed project and when project evaluation occurs.  The contract 
performance period extends to include commissioning a facility, where the KTR must 
show that the facility is performing to the specifications of the contract rather than just 
providing the items required by the contract.  This is a fundamental change from delivery 
of a project output toward CERP delivering desired outcomes.  Finally, as an input to 
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future projects the learning and feedback information return provides important lessons 
learned by formalizing knowledge sharing and decreases the impact of unit changeover. 
Discussion 
Considering the stages of the Causal Chain can help illuminate the effect of 
process adjustments on project outcomes.  The Causal Chain presented above highlights 
the importance of different considerations within project nomination and how they 
contribute to the eventual project outcome.  These considerations must continually be 
addressed and reevaluated within each project to minimize the likelihood of a negative 
incident.  Implementing the tools presented here can help decision makers evaluate CERP 
project nomination packages, increase the effectiveness of resources allocated to the 
effort, and aid interested parties in evaluation of CERP project outcomes. 
Additionally, to meet the call for outcome measurement and accountability for 
CERP, policy makers should seek to incorporate changes to guidance that encourages 
cooperative stakeholder planning and a partnership for project success.  Through flexible 
guidance that allows for an iterative process of SOP changes, the CERP program will be 
better equipped to bridge the gap between the program’s historical tradeoffs: strategic-
tactical, stability-legitimacy, expediency-sustainability, and addressing needs-building 
capacity.  Implementing the change will help to ensure CERP remains relevant and 
targeted at combating the insurgency as it reacts and continues to evolve in the future. 
Finally, this paper describes the evaluation, reflection and learning process that 
can accompany the Causal Chain method when applied to the CERP process in 
Afghanistan.  The utility of the method is not limited to military decisions regarding 
40 
COIN efforts.  This paper is but one example of how the tool can be applied across a 
spectrum of applications as a means for process evaluation and improvement. 
Disclaimer 
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the 
official policy or position of the United States Air Force, The Department of Defense, or 
the United States Government. 
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III. Results and Conclusions 
This chapter discusses the research findings in relation to the original questions 
outlined in Chapter One.  The scholarly article submitted to the 2012 Western Decision 
Science Institute Conference communicates some of the prominent results of the 
research.  However, due to particular constraints in the manuscript length and formatting 
standards, the article does not include a portion of results discussion beyond the Causal 
Chain tool.  This expanded format will fully address the conclusions and findings not 
included in the paper.  This chapter first discusses the research findings with respect to 
the research and investigative questions that generated the research.  The significance of 
the research is then discussed.  Finally, future research and a summary of the thesis form 
the concluding portion of the thesis.           
Phase One Investigative Questions’ Results and Conclusions Discussions: 
The following section provides each of the research questions outlined in the 
methodology described in Chapter One and a consolidated narrative of the findings 
resulting from the previously outlined methodology.  Process analysis diagrams created 
from the available data sources were created and have been presented in the scholarly 
article and are also available in the appendices. 
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Question One: In the CERP execution process, what value do required inputs 
contribute to project success? 
Nomination Phase 
The requirements of the DoD FMR 7000.14 and the Feb 2011 MAAWS-A SOP 
include project nomination inputs designed to facilitate coordination of CERP project 
intentions with local Afghan leaders, land owners, PRTs and BSOs.  The required 
documents are intended to facilitate further action on the part of the coordinating parties 
during project nomination prior to project approval and funding commitment.  (1) These 
documents alone do not add value that contributes to project success.  The intended 
contribution requires additional actions on the part of the coordinating parties to realize 
the benefit.  (2) Implied obligations from the nomination documents, of the parties that 
must take action to create the intended value, should not be assumed to have taken place.  
Rather than providing the documents as outlined in the MAAWS-A SOP and called for in 
the ADR, an effective practice might require the action directly rather than a 
memorandum expressing a commitment to conduct the action. 
For example, the MAAWS-A requires a coordination memorandum of agreement 
(MOA) that, according to the template, must stipulate an arrangement has been made to 
sustain the project after U.S. transference of control to the Afghan partner.  The MOA 
itself does not add value unless its creation is accompanied by the necessary planning, 
programming, budgeting and execution (PPBE) required to implement the stipulations of 
the MOA.  (3) To add the intended value, CERP implementers could look into the 
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Afghan partner’s plan with more scrutiny for the obligatory PPBE strategy and provide 
mentorship to the Afghan Ministry Line Director where necessary.  (4)  
If CERP is to ask its implementers to act as a mentor and execute a “Building 
Capacity” intention, then the request should be supported with necessary training of those 
implementers that addresses the Afghan PPBE process.  Observing current PRT training 
at Camp Atterbury, it is apparent that the focus is on combat skills and lacks the 
necessary resources to provide training for a capacity building mission.  Such training 
would require CERP implementer activities integrated throughout the training and subject 
matter experts to facilitate said training. 
(5) Additionally, for the greatest return the nomination process should not be a 
single linear flow of project programming documents and communication between 
stakeholders as described in the process diagrams.  The process could incorporate a series 
of iterative feedback loops where, among various other inputs, stakeholders and their plan 
for project sustainment could impact the initial design.  to ensure that it is effectively 
maintainable and adequate resources are available or attainable.  That is to say, the entire 
lifecycle of a project must be considered. 
Project Execution 
During project execution the MAAWS-A requires that the PM update the Afghan 
Development Report (ADR) in the Combined Information Data Network Exchange 
(CIDNE) throughout the project lifecycle as significant changes, milestones and/or events 
occur and at a minimum by the fifth day of each calendar month.  (1) Maintaining 
consistent documentation of the project is vital to project success in an environment 
where project executers may not remain constant throughout the duration of the project.  
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Often CERP projects span multiple PMs and without proper documentation any 
agreements between the contracting officer’s representative (COR) and the contractor or 
commitments to the local people are not transparent to a new PM or COR upon their 
arrival.  (2) Additionally, contracting officers are commonly geographically separated 
from the COR and PM and unable to regularly visit the project site or personally interact 
with the contractor.  Because of geographic separation, the volume of contracts and the 
availability of the low density high value asset, the contracting officer, oversight depends 
on delegated responsibility, trained representatives and thorough documentation. Regular 
updates ensure that a consistent message is presented from CERP implementers.  As an 
example, value that has been paid for is one element that is recorded and doing so helps 
to ensure that payments are not maid twice without additional progress.  (3) The status is 
maintained on a U.S. Secure computer network and is only declassified when appropriate 
classifications to the entire ADR are such that it may be transferred to a lower security 
system.  The classified system does not allow for good collaboration between the 
contractor and the U.S. Government and reports are often misclassified.  (4) CERP does 
not use industry standard methods to record project schedule, progress and earned value.  
Tools such as Gantt charts and other scheduling and project accountability methods 
standard to other military construction contract types could be implemented to record this 
progress and earned value accumulation for the CERP ADR, but should be on a system 
that can be common to all project execution partners.  A common system would allow 
better coordination, communication and cooperation, required elements for successful 
project teams (Badiru, 2009). 
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(5) Maintaining appropriate payment intervals for completed work is also critical 
to the success of project execution.  Unfulfilled commitments of incurred costs may lead 
to project delays, degraded relationships from hardship of contractor and laborers, and 
other unintended negative consequences.  To ensure that commitments are paid in a 
timely manner, the CERP PM is required to maintain a funding log and reconcile 
payments with the resource manager.  To verify that payments are made for value that is 
received, CERP implementers must make periodic site visits and quality checks to ensure 
that progress is in accordance with the SOW.  The value of these required checks is their 
ability to ensure that the product that is being produced will meet the anticipated targets 
for the desired outcome of the effort.  (6) Where quality in project execution is not 
maintained projects struggle to fulfill and sustain their intended purpose and therefore 
does not provide value commensurate with its costs.  Therefore, the volume of quality 
assurance site visits and the capacity to support the requirement should be considered 
when choosing among alternatives for how to achieve an effect, both during project 
nomination and the approval authority’s evaluation.  Once nominated by a commander, 
their signature should indicate a commitment to providing the oversight capability 
outlined in the nomination package, and if funded, planned missions should support that 
commitment.  Additionally, in return for their commitment to project oversight support, 
commanders should expect to see regular evaluations of progress and earned value 
leading toward desired outcomes.   
(7) Should indications point toward diminished returns from continued inputs and 
support, a process should be established to terminate or descope contracts based on a 
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cost/benefit analysis to maximize the return on investment or at worst, minimize the cost 
and control impact of disbenefits. 
Project Closure 
Per current guidance projects must be closed in CIDNE within thirty days of 
issuing the final payment on the contract.  CERP construction projects commonly have a 
one year warranty period, however this warranty period is not justification for the project 
to remain open or funds to be withheld from the contractor.  Without economic incentive 
under the contract, warranty periods are hard to enforce.  (1) The project executor’s 
leverage to enforce contract warranty issues is limited to the threat of a poor performance 
memorandum in the project file and therefore a weaker performance history when 
competing for future CERP project awards.  However, contracting officers have not 
consistently allowed past performance alone as sufficient justification for disqualification 
when their bid would otherwise be the lowest price technically acceptable.  The finding 
emphasizes the importance of a thorough punch list and project review before 
acceptance.  Additionally, to avoid premature acceptance, it must be clear to the Afghan 
recipients that premature occupation may constitute acceptance and therefore must be 
avoided until the fulfillment of contract obligations to the satisfaction of the contracting 
officer or their representative. 
During project closeout of the ADR in CIDNE, the system requires input in the 
following categories: project completion date, last payment date, actual contract jobs 
created, actual permanent jobs created, actual completion percentage, additional 
explanation for closure/termination, project results, media, project status.  (2) These 
categories and what is measured and recorded at the end of a project drive the actions 
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throughout the process (Bullock, 2006).  The measured metrics are a comparison between 
the number of jobs anticipated and those reported to have been created by the contract, 
which as a quantitative number could provide a useful statistic given the necessary 
support to record these numbers.  Without the requisite support, the recorded number 
becomes a subjective estimate of the number of jobs created, therefore limiting the 
metric’s reliability and usefulness.  Additionally, focusing in on the “Project Results” 
field, the MAAWS-A instructs “Identify the results of the project and articulate if/how 
the project goals and performance metrics were met.”  (3) Keeping in mind the 
requirement to close out the project within thirty days of final payment on the contract, 
the project results cannot fully be understood by the PM by the time that this field is 
populated.  Again, without the necessary support and time to accurately measure 
performance metrics the usefulness of any metrics reported are diminished.  (4) Finally, 
the instructions themselves are leading in their language, “if/how the project goals and 
performance metrics were met;” presumes that goals and metrics were evaluated, but 
does not ask for the metric to be reported on the ADR. 
Overall Process 
The CERP process requirements attempt to drive oversight and accountability for 
U.S. funds across all projects in a manner resembling project execution processes in 
garrison locations.  (1) However, the resources necessary to provide garrison level 
support for the volume of work done under CERP contracts does not hold the same 
resemblance. (2) As the number of projects increases toward the limit where all the 
implementer’s time is spent on the required documentation, universal requirements for 
projects drives implementers’ time toward being divided equally among every project’s 
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requirements regardless of the scope and cost of the project.  The equal division of time 
and attention resources is disproportionate to project size.  The program is designed to be 
an agile, quick reaction tool that can be implemented by all forces in the field seeking to 
meet urgent humanitarian needs.  (3) In an effort to improve the process, the value 
creating inputs that have been added under the MAAWS-A over time have created 
additional encumbrances on tactical units seeking to take advantage of the agility and 
responsiveness the CERP tool is intended to offer.  Perhaps the next step is to further 
divide the program, its requirements and the intent of each subgroup at the tactical level 
beyond the current bulk CERP/traditional CERP divisions within the MAAWS-A. 
 
Question Two: Which project stakeholders are considered, emphasized in current 
project nomination requirements? 
Among the lessons from his 2006 Lessons from Soldiering in Iraq, Gen Petraeus 
identified “increasing the number of stakeholders” as critical to the success of a COIN 
effort (Petraeus, 2006).  Accordingly CERP must also seek to increase its consideration 
for as many stakeholders as possible.  The research identified the following stakeholders, 
the associated program requirement that drives the consideration, and stakeholder’s 
interest: 
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Table 1: CERP Stakeholders 
Stakeholder 
CERP 
Requirement 
Interest 
GIRoA  Sustainment MOA  Sustainment costs, Impact on 
governance and populace support 
PDC  Letter of Justification  Impact and benefit to Afghan populace 
Land Owner  Land Use Agreement  Maximizing personal benefit in 
exchange for land 
Battle Space Owner  Coordination 
Memorandum 
Tactical effect synchronization, 
Increased security 
PRT  ADR, SOW, IGE, PMP, 
LoJ Memo 
Meet Urgent Humanitarian Need, 
Project executability, Oversight 
capacity, Minimize exposure to liability, 
Increase Afghan independence, Build 
capacity 
Contractor  Signed Contract  Executabiltiy of SOW, Maximize benefit 
to company, Minimize exposure to risk 
Project Approval Authority  CERP Slide, Approved 
Funding documents 
Operational and strategic effect 
synchronization, Financial accountability 
 
As apparent in the swim lanes from the project flow diagram in Figure 1, the 
project stakeholders that are emphasized in the current process appear to be the PRT, the 
contractor and GIRoA.  These three stakeholders are central to project nomination, 
coordination and execution.  The PRT and contractor represent the CERP implementer 
and the project manager and executer.  GIRoA plays a large role in identifying, 
prioritizing, and committing to the sustainment of projects.  Also, GIRoA should receive 
enhanced governance as a result of the project and serves as the face of the donor of the 
project to the Afghan populace.  Finally, the contractor holds great impact over the 
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outcome of the project and the greatest risk in the contracting vehicle that is used in the 
firm mixed price – design build implementation style. 
(1) The stakeholders that are emphasized are not necessarily the stakeholders that 
are intended to be targeted by the program required to provide “urgent humanitarian 
need.”  CERP projects by design should be about addressing urgent Afghan needs.  In 
order to provide the greatest benefit the process must consider other stakeholders, but 
additional stakeholders should be subordinate to the objective of fulfilling urgent 
humanitarian need and the stakeholder recipient that has the need.  When the process 
implementer becomes the customer of the process, the program has either gone astray or 
misled the financiers about its intent.  Much of the emphasis of the nomination process 
does not specifically address the need of recipient, but that of the implementer.  To 
maintain focus on the needs of the stakeholders with urgent humanitarian need, the 
process should tie each document back to its contribution to fulfilling the identified need, 
and measure its effectiveness at fulfilling the need at the end of the project. 
(2) If the provider of the benefits to the needy is to be the customer, some 
potential missing stakeholder documents might include: a Benefit to Cost Ratio analysis 
of a project to ensure the proportionality of its outcomes; a review of the assessability of 
purposed outcomes; a formal outline of how projects tie to strategic objectives; an earned 
value accountability system to demonstrate the value gained by spending U.S. Taxpayers’ 
treasure. 
(3) If the recipient of the intended benefits of a project is to be the primary 
stakeholder then there should likewise be additional program requirements.  To focus 
project nomination on stakeholder needs there should be: articulated needs that are 
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clearly defined so that they might be effectively evaluated at the end of a project and 
understood if they were met; free from constraints; in the appropriate sequence among 
other ongoing projects and needs; sized appropriately to be implemented by CERP; 
benefiting from the learning of previous projects.  This Definition, Soundness, Sequence, 
Size and Learning (Ballard, 2001) check should be included among project nomination 
documentation.  
 
Question Three: What consideration is given to process outcomes vs. outputs in the 
current CERP process? 
The current MAAWS-A CERP SOP includes Outcomes and Outputs within the 
ADR in the CIDNE program.  The ADR serves as the living project database of record 
throughout the project lifecycle from inception through closeout.  At project nomination 
the ADR requires an anticipated number of Afghans employed and effected by the 
project to be reported.  This number may be adjusted throughout the project until project 
closeout when the final actual values are to be reported.  Additionally, project funding 
status is also tracked on the ADR in addition to side by side comparisons of numeric 
values of the current status of funds that have been disbursed and the contract execution 
progress value.  Finally, at project nomination a letter of justification (LOJ) is required 
that must identify the reason the project is needed and its anticipated effects.  At project 
closeout these effects are to be revisited and the results of the project must be determined. 
(1) The ADR does not allow for a delayed determination of project outcomes or 
measures of success, nor does it afford the opportunity for the reevaluation of closed 
projects by the implementing organization that would drive learning from prior efforts 
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and potential improvements.  The past projects are generally only revisited for 
effectiveness by evaluation teams such as the Special Investigative General for 
Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR).  An added status within the ADR in CIDNE could 
be added after project transfer to its intended recipient and prior to full project closure.  
This could allow for continued evaluation of the project and additional contribution to 
both the recipient and the CERP implementer.  The additional oversight and learning that 
could occur would contribute to future projects and the measurement of previous projects 
that has been called for by Congress. 
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Phase Two Investigative Questions’ Results Discussions: 
 
Question One: How does the current preparation of the CERP battle space effect 
events and consequences of the CERP process.  
Current preparation of the program implementers is identified in the Causal Chain 
within each of the first two stages identified as Root Causes and Immediate Causes.  The 
result is identified in the Causal Chain within each of the final three stages identified as 
the Effect, Consequence and Delayed Consequence.  The following discussion will 
address the current result of the preparation on CERP projects and outcomes.  
In the example of the Causal Chain method presented in the published article in 
Chapter two, Tactical Counterinsurgency Decision Tool, the method analyzes project 
failure preceded by evolving negative events.  This is not to say that all projects have 
failed in this way, but is meant to be a tool to identify interjections to preclude events 
leading to failure.   
In the example many negative events precede the point where poor CERP project 
selection occurs.  The root cause stage identifies underlying causes systemic to CERP 
that fundamentally shape CERP’s capacity to operate across the theater.  Immediately 
preceding project selection, a list of localized factors contribute to the ability of an 
individual project’s ability to meet its objectives in the immediate cause stage.   
An example of this stage and its contribution are the competing interests within 
CERP that pull a project nominator to disperse projects throughout an AO.  However, the 
more dispersed projects are the less oversight and site visits will be available to 
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contribute to project success.  In the absence of guidance or direction, limited 
understanding of the paradox and how to strike a balance, between oversight and project 
dispersion across isolated locations by a project nominator, contributes to the outcomes 
identified in stages succeeding the incident.  Selecting a project that does not receive 
sufficient oversight may lead to poor construction, wasted resources and time.  Rework 
resulting from limited frequency of site visits costs the contractor, the government and 
the project recipient.  Poor quality in construction leads to unsafe and abandoned projects 
or increased operations and maintenance requirements.  If the project provides initial 
benefit to the population, CERP has increased pressure on the recipient to sustain the 
project’s benefit at high cost, potentially beyond what had been planned for in the 
original Sustainment MOA without receiving support from the project implementer that 
may have caused the increase in cost.  The added pressure may lead to mistrust and 
degraded relationships, a decrease in CERP’s future impacts.  Ultimately it may have 
been better to never implement the project, avoiding both the direct costs of the project 
and the unaccounted for indirect costs such as degraded relationships and making 
governance harder on GIRoA.  The example is not to say that all CERP leads to 
disproportionate costs to benefits, however many reports about the result of the current 
process indicate it has led to mixed outcomes of projects.  For example results of SIGAR 
inquiries have yielded “CERP… provided some benefits, but oversight weaknesses and 
sustainment concerns led to questionable outcomes and potential waste” (SIGAR Audit 
11-7, 2011).   
In some cases projects have been determined to be a success on ribbon cutting day 
and the CERP project to have a positive outcome.  In the Causal Chain described in this 
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research the effect is some positive reaction and its consequence is a gain of benefit as 
described by the LOJ for the project.  On ribbon cutting day it is determined that the cost 
of the project can be expected to yield some benefit and feedback and learning 
contributes this determination to the CERP implementers’ body of knowledge that will 
contribute to future projects.  However, according to the SIGAR report these same 
projects did not receive the same benefit described in the closeout documentation.  In 
fact, some cases describe projects that were originally reported to have created a benefit 
but over time yield no benefit, or worse a net-negative benefit.   
What changed between ribbon cutting day and the SIGAR Audit?  Time.  (1) The 
aperture of outcome determination is too small.  Project benefits and dis-benefits are not 
constant and are not insulated from the effects other projects and events in the area, nor 
from availability biases of recipients.  With an availability bias, a project is like last 
year’s birthday gift, it has all but been forgotten by the time the next gift is ready to be 
unwrapped.  Time diminishes the impact of a project’s outcome.  (2) The rate at which 
these effects may degrade can be slowed with intentional actions to keep the project 
actively providing benefit to the people by ensuring that PPBE takes place.  However, 
should the project not be maintained, necessary equipment or supplies not be sustained or 
the quality of the project fail, the project’s benefits will be diminished to zero benefit or 
perhaps worse, create a liability. 
Another thing that may change between ribbon cutting day and the delayed 
project effects might be other developments in the battle space.  The perception of a 
project is shaped not only by its own outcome, but by those of the other events affecting 
the same stakeholders.  (3) While a villager may love a school that provides education to 
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their children, any positive gains can be eliminated by the liability of negative events that 
dominate that of the school, such as collateral damage from U.S. forces operating in the 
area.  (4) Also, the law of diminishing returns applies.  As an area becomes saturated with 
CERP projects the anticipated benefit return is diminished by the volume of other 
positive events within the same area. 
A pessimistic view of the program might say that on a long enough timeline the 
best case scenario for a project would be the benefit returned to the project implementer 
slowly degrades to zero as the memory of who provided the project fades and only its 
functional benefit to the recipient remains.  This assumes the project is sustained and 
continues to function as intended.  If however, for some reason the project does not 
maintain some operational function it becomes a lasting reminder of a failed promise, a 
Monument to Failure.  While CERP implementers turnover and do not see the lasting 
effects of failed commitments to the local stakeholders, the delayed consequence is a 
compounding effect of previous failed projects.  Each day an Afghan crosses by an empty 
building, a washed out bridge or another abandoned project, they are reminded.  The 
compounding effects of these Monuments to Failure make it more and more difficult to 
obtain the same benefit that was once available. (5) Therefore, CERP has a limited useful 
life in a given area or conflict.  (6) Project timelines must consider how long effects must 
last and if they must maintain their benefit for the duration of the conflict or beyond to 
truly be effective. 
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Question Two: How may proposed interventions from Phase One contribute and 
affect the CERP causal chain? 
The proposed interventions along the Causal Chain are intended to address 
identified deficiencies in the CERP process and those identified contributions of events 
that precede the CERP process but still contribute to shaping CERP implementation.  The 
following discussion will address the anticipated effects of proposed process 
interventions. 
Question One, Phase One identified that training must address PPBE within the 
Afghan government to be able to capture benefits or achieve real sustainment and 
effectively mentor Afghans and build their capacity.  This intervention would address 
root causes contributing to how we prepare CERP implementers to make appropriate 
project selection decisions thus leading to improved outcomes.  Also, the same phase one 
question identified suggestions to improve the oversight and execution of CERP projects.  
Maintaining a consistent U.S. sight picture with documentation, a collaborative and 
accessible computer network for all involved parties and progress measurement tools 
based on industry construction practices, CERP will increase the quality of its output and 
therefore decrease the cost and strain on the project recipients and as a result our long 
term impact.  The project closeout suggestions include better recording of metrics, 
considering the usefulness of statistics and what is required to measure them and actually 
reporting the outcome results.  These closeout measures will help to drive the process by 
directing what is measure and reported.  By caring about and focusing on the 
measurements of outcomes the process should improve results for the recipients and 
indirectly the U.S. motives that drive the funding of the projects.  Finally, overall 
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suggestions about the process include considering the scope of the project, who is 
appropriate to implement it and the support required to do so effectively.  Is this truly 
what CERP is supposed to do?  An honest appraisal of this question when considered 
through the Causal Chain would require significant change, but would also drive 
dramatic results in the effects of projects, the consequences and intended consequences. 
Question Two, Phase One addresses the stakeholders of the CERP process.  When 
considering who the process is really intended to benefit the focus of the last three stages 
of the causal chain may change.  This research has assumed that the later stages of the 
chain have referred to the impact on the Afghan recipient’s perspective. 
Question Three, Phase One focuses the research on the idea that there is a 
fundamental difference between outputs and outcomes of the CERP process.  The Causal 
Chain is indeed focused on outcomes of a project rather than the outputs.  The intent of 
applying a tool to see how the project itself fits within the context of a larger system is 
truly the intent of the tool. 
Research Question Revisited 
How can the CERP be improved to yield measurable, positive outcomes across 
tactical level partners and aligned with strategic level intentions? 
By implementing the Causal Chain as a means to view a CERP project within the 
context of the larger system this research suggests that CERP would return improved 
results in the effect, consequence and delayed consequence stages.  By opening the 
aperture of the program and considering the final three stages of the causal chain helps to 
better align CERP with both tactical and strategic level intentions. 
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Review of Findings 
This research posed the question: How can the CERP be improved to yield 
measurable, positive outcomes across tactical level partners and aligned with strategic 
level intentions? 
The CERP project lifecycle extends beyond the current aperture of the program.  
As the Causal Chain perspective indicates any given project’s timeline is shaped by 
events well preceding the creation of the ADR and the CERP nomination package.  
Additionally, the effects and consequences of CERP extend well beyond ribbon cutting 
day.  The assumption inherent to the current CERP is that projects are discrete events 
with lasting effects that remain constant.  This is a poor assumption and without 
programmatic adjustment CERP will continue to yield unremarkable results and continue 
to build Monuments to Failure.  Also, stakeholders are the key to defining success of 
CERP projects.  The process stakeholders with the greatest interest in the project 
outcomes should be given a larger proportion over the direction of implemented projects.  
Afghan stakeholders are the external customer of the process and the larger COIN 
strategy.  Although, the fundamental assumption of the CERP program is flawed, that 
project recipients in a COIN environment will act rationally and support the cause that 
provides them the greatest benefit.  In fact, in the face of highly emotional events and 
unmet basic needs a person does not act rationally and their emotional state will trump 
rationality.  Project targeting must include both an assessment of the recipient’s state as 
well as the intended benefit that should be realized through each project.  This analysis 
could be done considering Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs and Herzberg’s Motivation and 
Hygiene Factors.  Additionally, CERP is implemented by a diverse group of practitioners 
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with a broad spectrum of resource levels to support program requirements while seeking 
assorted outcomes from projects.  The implementers’ needs should be addressed as 
internal customers of the process and varying levels of support and purpose considered 
during future program changes.   
Significance of Research 
The Causal Chain framework provides a tool that can help facilitate discussion 
among CERP policy makers to identify contributions of elements outside the program 
that provide constraints within which projects are implemented.  Some limitations and 
constraints identified herein can be removed or their effects minimized.  The research 
framework offers a perspective that can provide insight into the program and the effects 
of system elements, including project nomination requirements and project evaluation 
techniques, on program contributions to the overall strategic intent and how it might be 
improved.  The research offers specific identification of areas to target for improvement.  
Also, the benefit of the research is not only for the high level CERP managers, but 
tactical and operational implementers of CERP.  For CERP implementers the research 
will illuminate the importance of the contribution of more than just the engineer element 
within project execution and should unify the interdependent elements of a team that 
contribute to situational awareness of the local conditions, limits of capacity to execute 
projects and all elements maneuvering in and among the population.  Also, CERP 
implementers must also widen their focal point beyond a single project to how it is nested 
among other tactical elements, operational plans and ultimately strategic objectives. 
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Future Research 
This study touches on several facets within CERP project selection and 
reconstruction and development planning.  These facets offer opportunities for future 
research.  The general topics are as follows: 
 Through the application of geographic information systems, a researcher could 
investigate quantitatively the effect of project density and frequency on anticipated 
outcomes or progress indicators for strategic gains. 
 An expert research panel could look at paired comparisons of stakeholders and 
determine a hierarchy among them to determine the current emphasis of the program. 
 How can CERP as a weapon system be preserved and applied for future use in 
asymmetric war in other environments?  Application of the CERP could be 
considered for other locations, Africa, South America and other developing locations.  
How would differing environments impact the program and what is required for it to 
be effective? 
 USAID, World Bank and other development organizations use various metrics and 
means to assess and report project outcomes beyond self-declaration.  How can these 
be adapted for use with CERP?  What benefit would qualitative measurements used 
by these development organizations provide and at what cost? 
 A quantitative investigation into the value of construction inspection in a contingency 
environment under the current CERP conditions could indicate the real value of some 
of the program requirements.  Are there plateaus where different levels of supporting 
resources return varying levels of benefit to maximize the return?  How sensitive are 
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project outcomes to oversight for construction projects of various degrees of 
complexity? 
 A Cost-Benefit analysis of a CERP project requires both an ability to assess the 
outcomes of a project, but also the true cost of the project.  There is great variability 
in how CERP can be implemented with equally great variation in cost.  It would be 
prudent to weigh the costs of varying levels of oversight and the sensitivity of project 
benefits to these different levels. 
 As U.S. forces begin to draw down in Afghanistan, the timing of when ongoing 
projects conclude may not coincide with the transition in each province to the 
transitional authority.  In the event that transition occurs prior to CERP commitments 
close out, what impacts are expected by terminating incomplete projects or turning 
them over for Afghan oversight? 
Summary 
This research explored previously identified complaints about the reconstruction 
funding tool, the Commanders Emergency Response Program in order to assess the 
potential for programmatic changes that might enhance the ability to understand 
outcomes and improve program effectiveness.  The research methodology involved a 
series of investigative questions the led to a system analysis of the program and a 
descriptive causal chain framework to facilitate analysis of program inputs and outcomes.  
The investigation documents how the current system evaluates projects and highlights 
potential deficiencies that can be addressed.  The research was limited to CERP projects 
implemented in Afghanistan and evaluates the February 2011 version of the MAAWS-A 
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CERP SOP.  Future implications resulting from the research include a dilated perspective 
of how a project must be evaluated and the contributions of elements outside nomination 
documents on the ability of a selected project to achieve success.  Overall, the analysis 
promotes an application of a Causal Chain framework for discussion about the CERP 
reconstruction process in an attempt to link the anticipated outcomes of selected projects 
and strategic outcomes.  
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Appendix B:  CERP Value Stream Map 
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